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If exploitation of social partners increases
fitness, then selection should favor one
optimal winning strategy. However,
cheaters and losers often coexist. Here,
Wolf et al. show that different social
strategies can coexist in the social
amoeba D. discoideum due to trade-offs
between social traits, meaning that
simple views of cheating may be illusory.
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Cooperation is ubiquitous across the tree of life,
from simple microbes to the complex social sys-
tems of animals [1]. Individuals cooperate by
engaging in costly behaviors that can be exploited
by other individuals who benefit by avoiding these
associated costs. Thus, if successful exploitation
of social partners during cooperative interactions
increases relative fitness, then we expect selection
to lead to the emergence of a single optimal winning
strategy in which individuals maximize their gain
from cooperation while minimizing their associated
costs [2]. Such social ‘‘cheating’’ appears to be
widespread in nature [3], including in several micro-
bial systems [4–11], but despite the fitness advan-
tages favoring social cheating, populations tend to
harbor significant variation in social success rather
than a single optimal winning strategy. Using the
social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, we pro-
vide a possible explanation for the coexistence of
such variation. We find that genotypes typically
designated as ‘‘cheaters’’ [12] because they pro-
duce a disproportionate number of spores in
chimeric fruiting bodies do not actually gain higher
fitness as a result of this apparent advantage
because they produce smaller, less viable spores
than putative ‘‘losers.’’ As a consequence of this
trade-off between spore number and viability, geno-
types with different spore production strategies,
which give the appearance of differential social suc-
cess, ultimately have similar realized fitness. These
findings highlight the limitations of using single
fitness proxies in evolutionary studies and suggest
that interpreting social trait variation in terms of
strategies like cheating or cooperating may be
misleading unless these behaviors are considered
in the context of the true multidimensional nature
of fitness.1086 Current Biology 25, 1086–1090, April 20, 2015 ª2015 The AuthoRESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Social Success in D. discoideum
D. discoideum live as single-celled amoebae in terrestrial hab-
itats, but when their food is depleted, large numbers (105) of
individuals aggregate to form a multicellular fruiting body
[13, 14]. The fruiting body is comprised of dead stalk cells
that sacrifice themselves to hold aloft a ball of viable spores.
Importantly, because fruiting bodies can contain a mixture of
different genotypes, this is expected to lead to selection for
exploitative social ‘‘cheaters,’’ which in D. discoideum have his-
torically been defined simply as those strains that are overrep-
resented in the spore population of chimeric fruiting bodies
[12, 15–20]. Consistent with earlier experiments [21, 22], we
found that a set of genotypes isolated from a small geographic
area in North Carolina [23] showed highly significant quantita-
tive genetic variation (i.e., among-strain variation, H2) in the
relative number of spores produced by each strain after
amoebae were mixed in a 50:50 ratio and allowed to undergo
chimeric development (H2 = 0.35, credible interval (CI) =
[0.16, 0.62]; see Figure S1). This resulted in a linear (transitive)
dominance hierarchy (ttri = 0.73, p < 0.001; see [24]) with clear
cheaters and ‘‘losers’’ when defined solely in terms of spore
numbers. These observations thus raise a critical question:
what processes maintain such variation in apparent social suc-
cess in this species?
Trade-offs Exist between Spore Size, Number, and
Viability
One mechanism by which variation in social success could
persist is if fitness gains during social competition are offset
by inherent costs in another context (e.g., social traits ex-
pressed in a non-social context or through pleiotropic links be-
tween different social traits or social and non-social traits).
Such trade-offs could potentially lead to the coexistence of
diverse social behaviors, where different strategies have similar
overall fitness, and hence the variation is nearly neutral and
persists at mutation-selection balance [25]. It is also possible
that the traits mediating social interactions are shaped primarily
by selection in a non-social context, which incidentally gives
rise to variation in social fitness, but only as a neutral
byproduct.rs
Figure 1. The Pairwise Genetic Relation-
ships between the Four Fitness-Related
Traits
(A)–(C) show pairwise relationships between
different non-social traits, while (D)–(F) show the
relationship between these three non-social traits
and the proportion of spores in a chimeric spore-
head. All traits are illustrated in standard deviation
units, with the x axis scaled the same way in all
figures. The individual gray points are the simu-
lated strains from the Bayesian model generated
by MCMCglmm, and the red points are the
genotypic means. The diagonal lines in the figures
represent the best-fit line from linear regression,
with the gray band surrounding each line illus-
trating the 95% confidence interval.Fitness trade-offs for non-social traits are known to be
widespread [26]. For example, genotypes that produce greater
numbers of offspring often compromise their investment into
each individual offspring [27]. These quality-versus-quantity
trade-offs (often stated in terms of a size/number trade-off)
are ubiquitous in nature [28], with the optimum balance de-
pending on the organism and the environment [29]. However,
in the D. discoideum social system, where spores can be
thought of as ‘‘offspring,’’ studies have used only the relative
number of spores produced by different genotypes during
social encounters as a measure of relative social success
and thus social fitness, without consideration of the quality of
those spores. Therefore, this interpretation relies on the
implied and untested assumption that all offspring are created
equal. Here we challenge this assumption, reasoning that
D. discoideum genotypes could potentially produce large
numbers of small, low-quality progeny (i.e., small spores with
relatively low viability) or invest in smaller numbers of larger
but higher-quality progeny (i.e., larger spores with higher
viability). As the two strategies could result in the same overall
fitness return, such a trade-off could result in the persistence of
variation in spore investment strategies, which are in turn man-
ifested as variation in social strategies when the relative
numbers of spores produced in chimeras is considered as
the sole measure of ‘‘success.’’
To investigate the hypothesis that non-social trade-offs might
explain the persistence of variation in social traits by permitting
the coexistence of diverse social strategies, we quantified the
total number, size, and viability of spores produced by each
strain. We identified significant quantitative genetic variation
for the total number of spores produced (H2 = 0.25, CI =
[0.12, 0.41]), spore size (H2 = 0.59, CI = [0.20, 1.12]), and
spore viability (H2 = 0.62, CI = [0.19, 1.12]) (Figure S1). More-
over, we identified significant genetic correlations between all
three measures (Figure 1). First, the total number of spores pro-
duced was found to be significantly negatively genetically
correlated with spore size (r = 0.72, 95% credible interval,Current Biology 25, 1086–109CI = [–0.95, –0.43]; Figure 1A), demon-
strating that strains producing more
spores do so at least in part by making
smaller spores. Second, variation in
spore size was significantly positivelygenetically correlated with differences in spore viability (r =
0.86, CI = [0.65, 0.99]; Figure 1B), indicating that larger spores
hatch and survive better than smaller spores. Third, the varia-
tion in spore viability was significantly negatively genetically
correlated with variation in the number of spores produced
(r = 0.54, CI = [0.88, 0.22]; Figure 1C), revealing that geno-
types producing more, smaller spores also produce spores
with reduced viability.
Social Success Comes at the Cost of Decreased Spore
Viability
Having identified significant variation in traits associated with
apparent social success and spore traits, we next asked how
these traits translate into the total realized social fitness of
each genotype (where ‘‘social fitness’’ refers to the relative
fitness of different genotypes resulting from social interactions).
We found that the relative representation of spores of each geno-
type after chimeric development (chimeric representation) was
positively genetically correlated with total number of spores pro-
duced (r = 0.50, CI = [0.13, 0.79]; Figure 1D) and negatively
genetically correlated with spore size (r = 0.55, CI =
[0.85,0.18]; Figure 1E), suggesting that genotypes that pro-
duce more spores consequently have higher representation in
the chimeric sporehead but do so by producingmore but smaller
spores. However, because spore viability scales negatively
with spore size, this leads to a negative genetic correlation be-
tween viability and chimeric representation (r = 0.69, CI =
[0.95, 0.40]; Figure 1F). Together, these results lead to the
conclusion that genotypes that achieve higher representation
of spores in chimeric fruiting bodies do so by producing greater
numbers of lower-viability spores.
Trade-offs Negate Fitness Gained through Sporehead
Representation
By accounting for these correlations between traits (summarized
in Figure 2), we estimated a realized social fitness value that dis-














Figure 2. Summary of theGenetic Correlational Structure of the Four
Traits
The four traits are connected by the six genetic correlations, which were
estimated by MCMCglmm [30]. Positive correlations appear in blue, and
negative correlations appear in red. All correlations are significant (credible
intervals are given in the text).
Figure 3. Relationship between Realized Social Fitness and Spore
Size and Number
The relationships between realized social fitness (modeled as the product of
proportional representation in the chimeric sporehead and spore viability) and
spore number (A) and spore size (B) are illustrated using the simulated strains
from the Bayesian model (gray points) with a quadratic regression curve (black
line) and 95% confidence interval (gray band).by the subsequent viability of the spores produced. This analysis
clearly demonstrates that, due to trade-offs between traits,
the relationship between spore size (Figure 3A) or spore
number (Figure 3B) and realized social fitness is essentially flat.
Therefore, despite significant variation in both of these underly-
ing traits, which ultimately determine components of fitness,
this variation appears to be effectively neutral in terms of realized
social fitness.
Trade-offs Help Explain the Coexistence of Cheaters
and Losers
Social systems and measurements of social success are often
viewed from the perspective of a single fitness-related trait
(e.g., [12, 22]), which is then used as a proxy for total fitness.
Although this narrow consideration is sometimes unavoidable
given the challenge of measuring overall fitness in a relevant
environmental context, our results reveal that this narrow
perspective may produce misleading conclusions because it
ignores the fact that organisms are inherently ‘‘multidimen-
sional,’’ being composed of suites of traits that together deter-
mine their fitness. Realized fitness of any genotype will therefore
be the product of different, potentially conflicting components.
Moreover, examining fitness through this multidimensional
lens highlights the fact that traits affecting different aspects of
life history not clearly associated with social interactions could
have indirect effects on social success [31]. As a consequence,
although each individual trait may appear to confer a fitness
advantage (and therefore be under directional selection), the
multidimensional system of traits is constrained by trade-offs,
resulting in no net selection on the set of traits when viewed
as a whole [32].
The label of ‘‘cheater’’ has often been applied to D. discoi-
deum genotypes that have a higher representation of spores
than some of their competitors during chimeric fruiting body
development. One way this could occur is if genotypes
exhibit differences in developmental signaling that lead to
different ratios of spore or stalk cells [33]. Although this mecha-
nism is possible, it is hard to envisage how it could lead to
differences in total spore number, as well as affecting the size
or viability of resulting spores. We therefore believe it is more
likely that both trade-offs arise from differences in the number1088 Current Biology 25, 1086–1090, April 20, 2015 ª2015 The Authoof reductive cell divisions that occur during the multicellular
stages of the life cycle. Indeed, there is widespread evidence
supporting the idea that some cells, and especially those
destined to become spores, do indeed undergo division during
the migratory slug phase [34, 35]. If resources and biomass were
limiting and unequally partitioned in the multicellular slug, such
reductive division would result in smaller cells, thus providing
a plausible explanation for the resulting smaller spores ob-
served. This latter pattern appears to explain much of the varia-
tion observed, given that different spore production strategies
appear to result in similar social fitness as a result of trade-
offs. Under this scenario, different spore production strategies
are nearly neutral in terms of their influence on social fitness
(Figure 3), and hence the continuum of social behavioral strate-
gies seen in these genotypes may simply reflect low selection
pressure on social traits.
It is important to note, however, that although we have
shown that relative representation in the sporehead is a poor
measure of true social success, when interactions are viewed
from the perspective of realized social fitness (which includes
both spore number and viability) we find that there remains
variation in social fitness that should reflect the true nature of
cheaters and losers in this system (Figure 3). Similarly, in other
microbial systems such as Myxococcus and Pseudomonas,
cheater genotypes that exploitatively outcompete cooperators
in mixed groups have been described when social fitness is
measured in terms of the relative production of viable spores
or cells, respectively [5, 10]. This is almost certainly due to
the fact that microbes have complex life cycles and live in het-
erogeneously structured environments where diverse intra- and
interspecific dynamics will interact to affect fitness. Other life
history traits that we have not examined are no doubt manifestrs
in these ecologically relevant scenarios, and these in turn may
directly or indirectly influence the coexistence of apparent
social traits [36].
Our study therefore has clear implications for understanding
the evolution of social traits in terms of cheater or cooperator
strategies. Most notably, our results illustrate the importance of
considering life history trade-offs when assessing social fitness:
although many social systems, such as D. discoideum, may
appear unbalanced with individuals that appear to ‘‘win,’’ these
individuals are really no better off in terms of fitness than individ-
uals that appear to ‘‘lose.’’ These observations may thus explain
the paradoxical coexistence of substantial genetic variation in
apparent social success in this and potentially other social
organisms.
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